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Under Delaware law, corporate officers and directors are bound by two 
distinct obligations: fiduciary duties to stockholders as a whole, and 
contractual obligations entered into on behalf of the corporation.  One species 
of contractual obligation is “consent rights,” or limitations on what the 
corporation can do without approval from a specified party.  Such rights are 
commonly granted by corporations in contracts governing loans, joint 
ventures, and the issuance of preferred stock.  
When a consent rightsholder invokes its ability to block corporate 
conduct that management may otherwise believe is in the best interest of the 
corporation, management may face a conflict between its obligation to act in 
the best interests of stockholders and its obligation to respect the contractual 
rights to which the corporation voluntarily agreed.  Are there any 
circumstances, for example, under which a joint venturer should abandon its 
contractual obligations and take action that its fellow partner has 
unreasonably refused to approve?  At the extreme end of the spectrum, if the 
partner is blocking action indisputably in the best interests of the joint 
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venture, does that justify breaching the partner’s consent rights—and if so, 
how should courts address such a breach?  And does it matter if the partner 
is clearly using its consent rights to harm the company, thereby holding the 
company hostage until it pays an unjustifiably high ransom? 
Recent Delaware decisions have suggested that the doctrine of “efficient 
breach” may resolve this conflict.  Under this theory, a corporation may 
breach a party’s consent rights where doing so is in the best interest of 
stockholders, with the caveat—recently emphasized by the Delaware 
Supreme Court—that the corporation must pay damages to the consent 
rightsholder to fully compensate for its loss.  The invocation of this doctrine, 
however, raises several problems, not the least of which is how those 
damages should be calculated.  Although Delaware recognizes that rights 
may be valued based on a “hypothetical negotiation” for the rightsholders’ 
consent, there is not a single Delaware case in which a court awarded a 
substantial sum of money for the breach of a consent right, despite the high 
value that rightsholders tend to attach to these provisions during contract 
negotiations.  Equally troubling is the difficulty in determining whether a 
breach is truly “efficient,” given the reputational harm that may befall a 
corporation that breaches its promises to key contractual counterparties like 
lenders, partners, and investors. 
Like most matters of contract enforcement, these issues are best left to 
the bargaining table at the time of contracting—or, failing that, ex post 
negotiations between the parties once a dispute has arisen (fostered, if 
necessary, through injunctive relief).  Absent a negotiated solution, there will 
continue to be a conflict between satisfying Delaware’s well-established 
policy of enforcing contracts as they are written and the need to prevent a 
rogue consent rightsholder from inflicting harm through the misuse of its 
contractual privileges.  In general, courts should not attempt to resolve this 
conflict by protecting companies that breach a consent rightsholder’s 
interests under the “efficient breach” doctrine, as the difficulty of assessing 
damages ex post creates a substantial danger that any monetary remedy 
would be insufficient to satisfy the rightsholder’s reasonable expectations 
that the protections it negotiated would be strictly enforced under Delaware 
law.  Instead, courts should more readily look to equitable remedies to force 
the parties back to the bargaining table. 
I. THE NATURE OF CONSENT RIGHTS 
In Delaware, a corporation’s board of directors generally has the sole 
authority to make decisions on behalf of a corporation.  Consent rights, which 
are alternatively referred to as “approval rights,” “protective provisions,” 
“blocking rights,” or “veto rights,” chip away at this exclusive authority by 
vesting the right to approve or veto certain decisions with a third party (such 
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as a lender, business partner, or group of stockholders).  In essence, consent 
rights are a form of restrictive covenants that enable a contracting party to 
control certain corporate actions.  Consent rights may be held by a single 
party, or they may be subject to the vote of a collective group (such as a class 
of investors).  When they are controlled by a single party or a small, closely 
associated group of entities, consent rights can create substantial power to 
dictate corporate behavior.1  Conversely, when they are diffuse among a large 
group of unrelated rightsholders, the corporation has more leverage to obtain 
the groups’ approval.2 
A. Common Types of Consent Rights 
Consent rights are common features in at least three distinct types of 
contracts:3 
i.  Loan Agreements: Corporate debt lenders typically include a 
substantial number of restrictions designed to protect their right to 
repayment.  The consent rights set forth in these documents frequently 
require that a borrower obtain the lender’s approval to take on new debt or 
restructure the loan, engage in certain transfers, and issue new equity, and 
may also place restrictions on how loaned funds are to be used.4 
 
 1. See generally Marcel Kahan & Bruce Tuckman, Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond 
Covenant Changes?, 66 J. BUS. 499 (1993); id. at 512–13 (where bondholders with consent rights 
form coalitions, they modify consent terms and “realize some of the gains expected from covenant 
modifications”). 
 2. Id. at 500 (when bondholders with consent rights cannot coordinate, they “will consent to 
covenant changes even when it is not in their collective interest to do so”). 
 3. Of course, there are various types of consent rights, broadly defined, in many other types 
of documents.  For example, bond instruments often contain restrictive covenants “that are thought 
to prevent stockholder expropriation of bondholder wealth, for example, covenants that restrict a 
company’s ability to pay dividends, to incur additional debt, to engage in transactions with a 
controlling shareholder, or to sell assets without forcing the purchaser to assume the company’s 
obligations with respect to the bonds.”  Kahan, supra note 1, at 500.  When corporations look to 
remove these restrictions, they frequently do so by issuing consent solicitations to groups of 
bondholders at large.  Id.; see also Steve V. Mann & Eric A. Powers, Determinants of Bond Tender 
Premiums and the Percentage Tendered, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 547, 549 n.4. (2007) (“Consent 
solicitations can be stand-alone (which is relatively uncommon) or included with a tender offer or 
exchange offer . . . .”).  However, because bonds are typically diffusely held, corporations’ attempts 
to seek to modify the “consent rights” contained therein often involve an offer to the public rather 
than the type of one-on-one negotiations described throughout this Article.  See Kahan, supra note 
1, at 502.  For this reason, this Article omits further mention of the somewhat unique circumstances 
of consent rights contained in bond offerings. 
 4. See, e.g., Fletcher Int’l Ltd. v. ION Geophysical Corp., No. 5109-CS, 2013 WL 6327997, 
at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2013) (describing creditor approval rights associated with a $100 million 
credit facility); Timothy Davis, Steven Coury & Carlos Piñeiro, Key Provisions to Focus on When 
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ii.  Joint Venture Agreements: When two companies form a joint 
venture, it is natural that each venturer will wish to have measure of control 
over key decisions by the jointly formed corporation.5  Joint venture 
agreements typically vest managerial control over day-to-day activities in 
either one of the two partners or a third-party manager, but grant each of the 
individual corporate entities the power to veto major decisions.6  In recent 
years, Delaware courts have addressed the unique problems that arise when 
one party has the ability to “lock up” corporate operations by exercising its 
veto rights to prevent the company from engaging in operations necessary to 
its survival.7  In rare cases, courts will resolve true lock-up by dissolving or 
forcing a sale of the corporate entity.8 
iii.  Preferred Stock Certificates: Perhaps the most commonly analyzed 
type of consent rights are those that are associated with the issuance of 
preferred stock, as preferred stockholders’ contractual rights create the 
possibility of a sharp divergence between the interests of preferred and 
common stockholders.9  Generally, venture capitalists make investments 
 
 5. See generally Minority Protections in Joint Ventures, THOMPSON REUTERS: PRAC. L., 
https://us.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/Document/Id72c5839916511e79bef99c0ee06c731/Vie
w/FullText.html.  I use the term “joint venture” here to refer to a structure in which both participants 
have roughly equal bargaining power (although perhaps unequal stakes), and thus have the ability 
to negotiate beneficial consent rights for themselves. 
 6. See, e.g., Glidepath Ltd. v. Beumer Corp., No. 12220-VCL, 2019 WL 855660 at *6–7, 11–
12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2019).  Glidepath involved an LLC operating agreement which required a 
supermajority member approval for actions including “dissolving the Company, amending its 
certificate of formation, changing the legal form of the company, and admitting new members,” and 
written approval of a simple majority of members for actions including the admission or removal of 
management, capital expenditures above $10,000, contracts above $3,000,000, and any “material 
deviation from the Business Plan.”  Id. at *5–6. 
 7. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 273(a) (1953) (permitting dissolution of a joint venture if two 
50-50 owners are deadlocked); Shawe v. Elting, 157 A.3d 152, 154 (Del. 2017) (affirming the 
appointment of a custodian to sell a “hopelessly deadlocked” corporation).  The unique problems 
created by the use of consent rights in a joint venture are not the focus of this Article because such 
joint ventures are less likely to have a broad base of common shareholders to whom the joint 
venturers would owe a fiduciary duty. 
 8. See, e.g., Elting, 157 A.3d at 154–55 (affirming the Court of Chancery’s judgment that “the 
circumstances of the case required the appointment of a custodian to sell the company”). 
 9. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 49 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“The cash flow rights 
of typical VC preferred stock cause the economic incentives of its holders to diverge from those of 
the common stockholders.”) (citing William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 
1815, 1832 (2013)); Sarath Sanga & Eric Talley, Don’t Go Chasing Waterfalls: Fiduciary Duties in 
Venture Capital Backed Startups 1 (Oct. 31, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3721814 (stating that companies backed by 
venture capitalists who own preferred stock can be “crucibles of conflict”).  This is particularly true 
because preferred stock generally comes with a liquidation preference over common stock, meaning 
that preferred shareholders are often entitled to receive both repayment of their initial purchase price 
and any accrued dividends before common stockholders receive any money in a liquidation or other 
event that yields a change of control.  Trados, 73 A.3d at at 47–50; see generally D. Gordon Smith, 
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through the purchase of preferred stock accompanied by a set of consent 
rights, commonly referred to collectively as “protective provisions.”10  Each 
set of consent rights associated with an issuance of preferred stock is typically 
“highly negotiated” and then incorporated into a certificate of designations.11  
“[T]hese provisions seek to protect the investment of the preferred 
stockholders from actions by the company that may dilute or diminish their 
investment” and must be strictly construed.12  Common consent rights in this 
context include the right for a majority of the preferred stockholders to 
approve: (i) major corporate actions such as a merger, dissolution, IPO, or 
sale: (ii) the issuance of equity and incurrence of debt; (iii) changes to the 
business plan or major projects; and/or (iv) the compensation and termination 
of executive officers.13  One less common but potentially powerful right is a 
stockholder redemption right, which “allow[s] [i]nvestors to force the 
[c]ompany to redeem their shares” for a set price.14  While “redemption rights 
are not often used,” they “do provide a form of exit and some possible 
leverage over the [c]ompany.”15  Conversely, while many certificates of 
designations include a “no impairment” provision stating that the “company 
will not take any action that would impair the rights, powers, and preferences 
 
The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315, 339 (2005) (noting that preferred 
shareholders’ liquidation preference includes “the original issue price of the preferred stock”). 
 10. ANDREW METRICK & AYAKO YASUDA, VENTURE CAPITAL & THE FINANCE OF 
INNOVATION 150 (2d. ed. 2011) (“VCs typically purchase some form of preferred stock.”) 
(emphasis omitted); Smith, supra note 9, at 339; C. Stephen Bigler & Jennifer Veet Barrett, Words 
that Matter: Considerations in Drafting Preferred Stock Provisions, 2014 BUS. L. TODAY 1, 2 
(2014); see also Trados, 73 A.3d at 48 n.22 (“When investing in the United States, VCs almost 
exclusively use preferred stock.”). 
 11. See Bigler & Barrett, supra note 10, at 2 (“Among the most highly negotiated contractual 
provisions related to preferred stock are the so-called ‘protective provisions,’ which are contained 
in the certificate of incorporation and set forth a list of actions that the company cannot take without 
the prior consent of a specified percentage of the outstanding preferred stock.”); see also Edward 
Ackerman & Angelo Bonvino, Preferred-Stock Minority Investments in the Private Equity Context, 
LEXIS PRAC. ADVISOR J. at 1–4 (2017), https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3977420/
bonvinoackerman_5oct2017.pdf; Smith, supra note 9, at 338–40 (noting that investors lacking 
board control “typically seek more targeted protection” during contract negotiations).  Although 
less common, in addition to certificates of designations, preferred consent rights could theoretically 
appear in articles of incorporation, registration rights agreement, investor rights agreement, and/or 
stockholder agreements.  See MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, No. 4521-CC, 2010 WL 1782271, at 
*6–7 & n.31 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2010) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (a), (f) (2017) (noting 
that for corporations, the rights of preferred stock shall be set forth or summarized on the stock 
certificate but may also appear in certificates of incorporation or corporate board resolutions); see 
also Searchlight CST, L.P. v. MediaMath Holdings, Inc., No. 2020-0652-SG, 2020 WL 5758023, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28, 2020) (noting that an investor rights agreement executed in connection 
with the purchase of preferred stock created “certain limitations on the Defendant’s freedom of 
action”). 
 12. Bigler & Barrett, supra note 10, at 3. 
 13. Ackerman & Bonvino, supra note 11, at 7–8. 
 14. METRICK & YASUDA, supra note 10, at 474 n.11. 
 15. Id. 
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of the holders of the company’s existing preferred stock,” this provision is 
generally of limited value.16  That is because courts have ruled that each 
consent right must be expressly set forth in the certificate or applicable 
document, and a “no impairment” provision cannot act as a “gap filler” to 
imply the existence of rights that were omitted.17  Commentators have noted 
that the allocation of consent rights between preferred investors and a target 
corporation is important because these rights provide each side with key 
points of control in the management of the corporation.18 
B.  Judicial Enforcement of Consent Rights 
Courts have consistently found that consent rights should be enforced 
as they are drafted, and that parties may use their contractual rights to approve 
or veto corporate action if they determine that doing so is in their “best 
interests.”19  This view is in keeping with Delaware’s “especially strong 
principle” that the parties’ contractual bargain must be enforced according to 
its express terms.20  As the Delaware Supreme Court held, “A party does not 
act in bad faith by relying on contract provisions for which that party 
bargained where doing so simply limits advantages to another party.  We 
cannot reform a contract because enforcement of the contract as written 
would raise ‘moral questions.’”21  Thus, when a party holds a set of consent 
 
 16. Bigler & Barrett, supra note 10, at 3.  
 17. Id. (citing WatchMark Corp. v. ARGO Global Capital, LLC, No. Civ.A 711-N, 2004 WL 
2694894 (Del. Ch. Nov. 4, 2004)). 
 18.   Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital Contracts, 29 
RAND J. ECON. 57, 60 (1998) (consent rights “matter either because they allow one party to make a 
decision in the presence of conflict of interest or because they affect the threat points in any 
renegotiation”). 
 19. See Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, No. 5001-VCS, 2010 WL 2929708, at 
*6 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010) (holding that defendant was entitled to use its consent rights in its “best 
interests”); In re MONY Grp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 683 (Del. Ch. 2004) 
(“Stockholders of Delaware corporations have the right to vote their shares in their own interest.”); 
Miller v. Am. Real Estate Partners, L.P., No. CIV.A.16788, 2001 WL 1045643, at *13 n.35 (Del. 
Ch. Sept. 6, 2001) (“Under Delaware corporation law, . . . a stockholder is entitled to vote its shares 
in its own self-interest.”). 
 20. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347, at *60 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (“The proper way to allocate risks in a contract is through bargaining between 
parties.  It is not the court’s role to rewrite the contract between sophisticated market participants, 
allocating the risk of an agreement after the fact, to suit the court’s sense of equity or fairness.” 
(citation omitted)), aff’d, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018); NACCO Indus., Inc. v. Applica Inc., 997 A.2d 
1, 35 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“Delaware upholds the freedom of contract and enforces as a matter of 
fundamental public policy the voluntary agreements of sophisticated parties.”); Pers. Decisions, Inc. 
v. Bus. Planning Sys., Inc., No. 3213-VCS, 2008 WL 1932404, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 5, 2008) 
(“Delaware is a freedom of contract state, with a policy of enforcing the voluntary agreements of 
sophisticated parties in commerce.”), aff’d, 970 A.2d 256 (Del. 2009).  
 21. Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1128 (Del. 2010).  Interestingly, in Nemec it was the 
corporation that held a freestanding right to redeem former officer and directors’ stock at book value 
after the expiration of a two-year period.  Id. at 1123.  The corporation chose to exercise this right 
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rights, it does not violate a duty to other stockholders “by exercising those 
rights as it wishe[s].”22 
Parties arguing otherwise have generally failed to find traction in 
Delaware courts.  For example, in Superior Vision Services, Inc. v. ReliaStar 
Life Insurance Co.,23 ReliaStar, a shareholder with a 44% stake in the plaintiff 
company, had the ability to block all dividend payments (which required 
consent from two-thirds of all shareholders).24  Over the course of a year, the 
plaintiff tried three times to issue a dividend, and ReliaStar initially refused 
to consent each time—allegedly in accordance with its “practice to withhold 
its consent to dividends in order to strong-arm individual stockholders or 
SVS to further its own agenda.”25  For the first dividend, ReliaStar relented 
and gave its consent only after a shareholder owning 32% of the outstanding 
stock promised to support a sale of the company.26  ReliaStar refused to 
consent to the Board’s next two attempts to pay dividends, prompting the 
company to seek a declaratory judgment that it was permitted to issue 
dividends, and that by wrongfully withholding its consent, ReliaStar 
breached its fiduciary duties and its duty of good faith and fair dealing.27  
Vice Chancellor Noble had little difficulty dismissing the complaint.28  With 
respect to the “remarkably unconventional” argument that ReliaStar 
“breached its fiduciary duties by, among other things, withholding its consent 
to the payment of dividends without any economic justification or other bona 
fide reason,” Vice Chancellor Noble held that a shareholder owes no 
fiduciary duties merely because it “exercises a duly-obtained contractual 
right that somehow limits or restricts the actions that a corporation otherwise 
would take.”29  The court also easily rejected the argument that ReliaStar 
 
one month before closing the multi-billion dollar sale of a major line of business, thereby depriving 
the plaintiffs of approximately $60 million that they would have received had the redemption 
occurred after the sale.  Id. at 1124–25.  Because the corporation was contractually entitled to 
redeem the stock during this period, the court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s dismissal of the 
case, stating that the corporation’s “directors did nothing unfair and breached no fiduciary duty by 
causing the Company to exercise its absolute contractual right to redeem the retired stockholders’ 
shares at a time that was most advantageous to the Company’s working stockholders.”  Id. at 1127. 
 22. Ford v. VMware, Inc., No. 11714-VCL, 2017 WL 1684089, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2017). 
 23. No. Civ.A. 1668-N, 2006 WL 2521426 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2006). 
 24. Id. at *1. 
 25. Id. at *1. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at *2. 
 28. Id. at *7. 
 29. Id. at *3–5.  The court left open the possibility, however, that fiduciary duties could arise 
under the “controlling shareholder” doctrine “where the holding of contractual rights [was] coupled 
with a significant equity position and other factors.”  Id. at *5.  If a consent rightsholder is deemed 
a controller, it has fiduciary duties and the analysis changes considerably regarding how it can use 
its contractual rights.  Recent case law suggests that this exception may have begun to swallow the 
rule.  For example, Vice Chancellor Slights recently applied this rule to permit a case to survive a 
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breached any implied good faith obligation, given that the contract “place[d] 
no express limitation on ReliaStar’s discretion.”30  Without an explicit 
condition that consent could not be unreasonably withheld, the court declined 
to “read a reasonableness requirement into a contract entered into by two 
sophisticated parties.”31  Such a result was required under Delaware law, the 
court held: “It is imperative that contracting parties know that a court will 
enforce a contract’s clear terms and will not judicially alter their bargain, so 
courts do not trump the freedom of contract lightly.”32 
Four years later, in Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC,33 a 
plaintiff again brought implied covenant and breach of fiduciary duty claims 
against an LLC member that refused to consent to certain “major decisions” 
in connection with the development of property in Colorado.34  Then-Vice 
Chancellor Strine dismissed the complaint, again emphasizing that Delaware 
courts must enforce contracts according to their express terms: “Delaware 
 
motion to dismiss where the complaint alleged that the minority members of a limited-liability 
company used their consent rights (called “blocking rights”) to “drive [the LLC] into bankruptcy, 
and then pounced on the opportunity to acquire [the LLC]’s valuable assets on the cheap when they 
came up for sale as part of the debtor’s bankruptcy plan.”  Skye Mineral Inv’rs, LLC v. DXS Capital 
(U.S.), Ltd., No. 2018-0059-JRS, 2020 WL 881544, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2020).  The court 
agreed with the general principle that merely having a consent right did not transform the minority 
members into controllers with attendant fiduciary duties, but held that the complaint alleged more: 
specifically, that the members also engaged “in a concerted effort” to place the company “in a 
precarious financial condition” before exercising their “unilateral power” to force a shutdown.  Id. 
at *27; see also Voigt v. Metcalf, No. 2018-0828-JTL, 2020 WL 614999, at *1–2, 19 (Del. Ch. Feb. 
10, 2020) (denying a motion to dismiss because it was “reasonably conceivable” that a private equity 
firm with 34.8% of a company’s voting rights and substantial board representation was a controller 
with fiduciary duties, noting that its wide range of contractual veto rights “weigh[ed] in favor of an 
inference that [the fund] exercised control over the Company generally by giving [the fund] power 
over the Company beyond what the holder of a mathematical majority of the voting power ordinarily 
could wield”).  While this exception appears to be increasingly important, for the purposes of this 
Article I assume that the consent rightsholder does not have other attributes that would render it a 
controlling stockholder. 
 30. Superior Vision Servs., Inc., 2006 WL 2521426, at *5. 
 31. Id. at *6 (quoting Gildor v. Optical Solutions, Inc., No. 1416-N,  2006 WL 1596678, at *7 
n.17 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2006)). 
 32. Id. 
 33. No. 5001-VCS, 2010 WL 2929708 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010). 
 34. Id. at *1, 5.  The “major decisions” included the right to: “‘approve or disapprove the annual 
Business Plan, the annual proposed budget update or . . . any amendment or modification of the 
Business Plan then in effect or any amendment to the Approved Budget then in effect to the extent 
that such action would constitute a Material Action;’ ‘‘“make expenditures on behalf of the LLC[s] 
or its subsidiaries to the extent such expenditures would constitute a Material Action;’ ‘incur, place, 
replace, renew, extend, substitute, add to, supplement, amend, modify, increase, restructure or 
refinance any borrowing by the LLC[s] or [their] subsidiaries . . . or to negotiate or enter into any 
binding agreement to do any of the foregoing’ unless the borrowing is ‘incurred in the ordinary 
course of business’ and ‘less than $50,000;’” and “‘amend, modify, or deviate from, the Business 
Plan or the Approved Budget of the LLC in a manner which would constitute a Material Action.’”  
Id. at *2–3 (alterations in original) (quoting Complaint at Exhibit B §§ 6.3.1–6.3.13, Related 
Westpac, 2010 WL 2929708). 
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law respects the freedom of parties in commerce to strike bargains and honors 
and enforces those bargains as plainly written.”35  Because the plaintiff had 
“clearly relinquished any reasonableness condition to [defendant’s] consent 
right as to future business plans and budgets” when the parties were “[a]t the 
bargaining table,”36 Vice Chancellor Strine concluded: 
Under the plain terms of the operating agreements, the defendant 
member had bargained for the right to give consents to decisions involving 
material actions or not, as its own commercial interests dictated.  Having 
bargained for that freedom and gained that concession from the operating 
member, the defendant member is entitled to the benefit of its bargain and 
the operating member cannot attempt to have the court write in a 
reasonableness condition that the operating member gave up.37 
As these cases make clear, Delaware courts’ robust policy of enforcing 
contracts as written extends to the invocation of consent rights, even when 
the party using its consent rights is presumed to be doing so unreasonably or 
unfairly.38 
This strong judicial enforcement of consent rights has important public 
policy implications.  Consent rights are frequently negotiated as a material 
component of contracts that allow a corporation to raise capital, and investors 
therefore rely on these provisions in making decisions about whether to 
invest capital into a corporation.  As Vice Chancellor Balick noted in the 
context of consent rights in certificates of designation for preferred stock, 
“[i]f there were no protections, investors would be afraid to take the risk.  If 
corporations are able to market preferred stock, investors have to be able to 
rely on protections when they are expressed with reasonable clarity.”39  Thus, 
 
 35. Id. at *6. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at *1; see also id. at *8 (“Under the Operating Agreements, JER Snowmass was left free 
to give consents to Major Decisions involving Major Actions as it chose, in its own commercial 
interest.  That freedom was not qualified by any fiduciary duty of so-called ‘reasonableness’ and to 
imply such a duty in these circumstances would nullify the parties’ express bargain.”). 
 38. See also Thermopylae Capital Partners, L.P. v. Simbol, Inc., No. 10619-VCG, 2016 WL 
368170, at *13–14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2016) (rejecting the argument that a preferred stockholder 
became a fiduciary obligated to act in the best interest of the company due to its “blocking rights” 
because “an individual who owns a contractual right, and who exploits that right—even in a way 
that forces a reaction by a corporation—is simply exercising his own property rights, not that of 
others, and is no fiduciary”); PWP Xerion Holdings III LLC v. Red Leaf Res., Inc., No. 2017-0235-
JTL, 2019 WL 5424778, at *16 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2019) (granting summary judgment to enforce 
preferred stockholder’s consent rights, stating, “Stockholders in Delaware corporations have a right 
to control and vote their shares in their own interest . . . . It is not objectionable that their motives 
may be for personal profit, or determined by whim or caprice, so long as they violate no duty owed 
other shareholders.” (quoting Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987))). 
 39. Matheson v. Kaiser Aluminum Corp., No. 14900, 1996 WL 33167234, at *3 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
8, 1996).   
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without the assurance that consent rights would be enforced by Delaware 
courts, the ability of corporations to secure capital would be at risk.40   
On the other hand, courts’ refusal to recognize any good faith or 
“reasonableness” check on the use of consent rights means that parties are 
free to abuse those rights to hold a company hostage until its demands are 
met—even where those demands are wholly untethered from the issue for 
which consent is sought.  It is understandable why a company, when faced 
with such onerous circumstances, would look for an escape hatch. 
II. UNDER DELAWARE LAW, MANAGEMENT HAS NO FIDUCIARY 
OBLIGATION TO ABIDE BY A COMPANY’S CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATIONS 
Meanwhile, Delaware has been developing a separate body of law 
exploring what happens when a party’s contractual rights create a potential 
conflict with director and officers’ fiduciary obligations to the corporation 
and its common shareholders.  While the former line of cases emphasizes the 
importance of contractual consent rights, these cases highlight managements’ 
countervailing fiduciary duties—which in some circumstances, at least, 
would seem to open up the possibility that management should breach 
contractual consent rights so long as it serves the best interests of the 
corporation as a whole.  It is worth noting that this potential approval of a 
corporation’s decision to violate its contractual obligations is starkly at odds 
with Delaware’s treatment of a corporation that violates statutory or 
regulatory law, which is prohibited in all circumstances no matter how 
beneficial such a violation might be for the corporation.41 
Chancellor Allen previewed the possibility of efficient breach in Orban 
v. Field,42 a case brought by common stockholders who received nothing in 
a corporate merger because the amount owed to the preferred stockholders 
was greater than the total merger consideration.43  The plaintiffs alleged that 
the board had “exercised corporate power against the common and in favor 
of the preferred and, thus, breached a duty of loyalty to the common” by 
helping preferred stockholders “overcome a practical power that the common 
 
 40. In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 48–49 (Del. Ch. 2013); Smith, supra note 9, 
at 319–20, 346–47. 
 41. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[O]ne cannot act loyally 
as a corporate director by causing the corporation to violate the positive laws it is obliged to obey.” 
(citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1953) (barring a corporation from exculpating directors 
for personal liability for breaches of fiduciary duty based on, inter alia, “a knowing violation of 
law”)). 
 42. No. 12820, 1997 WL 153831 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1997). 
 43. Id. at *1. 
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held to impede the closing of the merger.”44  The court rejected this argument, 
finding that the board’s conduct satisfied the applicable fairness standard.45  
In so doing, the court recognized the doctrine of efficient breach as a “fact of 
legal life,”46 but held that it would be “bizarre” to use it to find that the board 
had a duty to the common stockholders to breach “the corporation’s legal 
obligations to its other classes of voting securities.”47 
More recently, courts—led by Vice Chancellor Laster—have been more 
willing to recognize the possibility that fiduciary duties may create an 
obligation to breach a company’s contractual obligations to preferred 
shareholders.  The seminal case discussing fiduciary obligations when a 
conflict arises between the interests of preferred and common shareholders 
is Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion in In re Trados Inc. Shareholder  
Litigation48  Prior to Trados, there was uncertainty as to “whether a fiduciary 
duty should be owed in a particular situation to the preferred stockholders, or 
whether their rights should be limited to their contractual rights.”49  Much ink 
has been spilled regarding the implications of the Trados decision, which 
need not be repeated here.50  For the purposes of this Article, it suffices to 
say that Trados reaffirmed that “the rights and preferences of preferred stock 
are contractual in nature,”51 and consequentially, “[p]referred stockholders 
are owed fiduciary duties only when they do not invoke their special 
contractual rights and rely on a right shared equally with the common 
 
 44. Id.  The board allowed plaintiffs’ common stock to be diluted by preferred shareholders 
exercising their warrants, thereby preventing the plaintiff stockholders from holding sufficient 
shares to block the merger.  Id. at *8. 
 45. Id. at *9. 
 46. Id. (“Certainly in some circumstances a board may elect (subject to the corporation’s 
answering in contract damages) to repudiate a contractual obligation where to do so provides a net 
benefit to the corporation.  To do so may in some situations be socially efficient.”) (citing Richard 
Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
629 (1988)); see also Merck & Co. v. SmithKline Beecham Pharm. Co., No. C.A. 15443-NC, 1999 
WL 669354, at *51 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 1999), aff’d mem., 746 A.2d 277 (Del. 2000), and aff’d, 766 
A.2d 442 (Del. 2000) (“Our courts have recognized, even if only by implication, that in appropriate 
circumstances breach of contract is justified and efficient.”) (citing E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. 
v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 445 (Del. 1995)). 
 47. Orban, 1997 WL 153831, at *9. 
 48. 73 A.3d 17, 35–36 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 49. Marilyn B. Cane, Joong-Sik Choi & Scott B. Gitterman, Recent Developments Concerning 
Preferred Stockholder Rights under Delaware Law, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 377, 382 (2011). 
 50. See, e.g., Adam M. Katz, Addressing the Harm to Common Stockholders in Trados and 
Nine Systems, 118 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 234, 234 (2018) (Trados “involved the peculiar 
corporate law equivalent of a burglary in which nothing was stolen”); Abraham J.B. 
Cable, Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate Law, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 51, 57 (2015) 
(“Trados is an important case, but one that should be invoked sparingly.”); Lisa R. Stark, Side-
Stepping Fiduciary Issues in Negotiating Exit Strategies for Preferred Stock Investments After 
Trados, 2013 BUS. L. TODAY 1 (2013).   
 51. Trados, 73 A.3d at 39 (quoting In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig. (Trados I), No. 1512-CC, 
2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009)).   
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stock.”52  The principle that emanates from this rule is that directors must 
“maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its residual 
claimants, the ultimate beneficiaries of the firm’s value, not for the benefit of 
its contractual claimants.”53  While prior case law had stated that directors 
are bound “to pursue the best interests of the corporation and its common 
stockholders, if that can be done faithfully with the contractual promises 
owed to the preferred,”54 Trados went a step further and stated that a director 
could potentially breach its fiduciary obligations by favoring the preferred’s 
contractual rights at the expense of common stockholders.55  Despite this 
warning shot, however, the court ultimately ruled that the board did not 
violate its fiduciary duties by approving the sale at issue—in which common 
stockholders ended up with nothing—because the company “did not have a 
reasonable prospect of generating value for the common stock.”56   
Vice Chancellor Laster faced another preferred-common rift four years 
later in Frederick Hsu Living Trust v. ODN Holding. Corp.57  There, the 
founder of a California corporation called Oversee.net sued a venture 
capitalist that had invested $150 million in exchange for preferred shares in 
ODN Holding Corporation (“ODN”), a holding company for Oversee.net.58  
The preferred shares carried a redemption right after five years if the 
company had “legally available funds” to redeem the stock.59  ODN was 
contractually obligated to “take all reasonable actions (as determined by the 
[Company’s] Board of Directors in good faith and consistent with its 
fiduciary duties) to generate, as promptly as practicable, sufficient legally 
available funds to redeem all outstanding shares of [Preferred Stock].”60  The 
founder alleged, however, that the ODN board had violated its fiduciary 
obligations by harming the long-term prospects of the company by 
maximizing the redemption of preferred stock.61  Vice Chancellor Laster 
 
 52. Id. at 39–40. 
 53. Id. at 40–41. 
 54. Id. at 41 (quoting LC Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. James, 990 A.2d 435, 452 (Del. Ch. 
2010)) (emphasis added). 
 55. Id. at 41–42; see also Bigler, supra note 10, at 3–4 (citing In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 
73 A.3d 17, 49 (Del. Ch. 2013) (“If there is a divergence of interests between the holders of the 
preferred stock and common stock in a sale because, for example, all of the sale proceeds would go 
to the preferred stock and none of it would reach the common stock, it will generally be the duty of 
the board of directors to prefer the interests of the common stockholders to those of the preferred 
stockholders.  In fact, directors could breach their fiduciary duties if they favor the interests of the 
preferred stockholders under these circumstances.”). 
 56. Trados, 73 A.3d at 76–78. 
 57. No. 12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, at *23–24 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2017).  
 58. Id. at *1.  
 59. Id. at *1, 6. 
 60. Id. at *4 (alterations in original). 
 61. Id. at *5.  Although both Trados and ODN assume that venture capitalists are excessively 
interested in short-term returns, potentially to the detriment of common stockholders’ long-term 
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denied ODN’s motion to dismiss, rejecting the preferred stockholders’ 
argument that ODN’s contractual obligations meant that “the corporation had 
an obligation to fulfill its contractual commitment”:62 
It is true that the fiduciary status of directors does not give them 
Houdini-like powers to escape from valid contracts . . . . But the 
fact that a corporation is bound by its valid contractual obligations 
does not mean that a board does not owe fiduciary duties when 
considering how to handle those contractual obligations; it rather 
means that the directors must evaluate the corporation’s 
alternatives in a world where the contract is binding. Even with an 
iron-clad contractual obligation, there remains room for fiduciary 
discretion because of the doctrine of efficient breach.  Under that 
doctrine, a party to a contract may decide that its most 
advantageous course is to breach and pay damages.  Just like any 
other decision maker, a board of directors may choose to breach if 
the benefits (broadly conceived) exceed the costs (again broadly 
conceived).63 
If breaching a contract may be in the best interest of all stockholders, 
then, there exists a “corollary” principle that “directors who choose to comply 
with a contract when it would be value-maximizing (broadly conceived) to 
breach could be subject, in theory, to a claim for breach of duty.”64 
Understandably, Vice Chancellor Laster’s decision in ODN triggered a 
number of alarmist articles warning preferred stockholders that their 
contractual rights may not be as secure as they had previously believed.65  
Various law firms issued practitioner notes recommending that attorneys 
negotiating the purchase of preferred stock take additional precautions to 
 
interests, others have written that “[a] growing literature in behavioral finance and psychology now 
provides sound reasons to conclude that corporate managers often fall prey to long-term bias—
excessive optimism about their own long-term projects” to which venture capitalists “can provide a 
symbiotic counter-ballast.”  Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias (ECGI Working Paper 
Series in Law, Paper No. 449, 2019). 
 62. ODN Holding Corp., 2017 WL 1437308, at *23.  
 63. Id. at *23–24. 
 64. Id. at *24.  Following ODN, Vice Chancellor Laster issued an opinion in Glidepath Ltd. v. 
Beumer Corp. extending these core principles to decide whether the buyer of an LLC breached its 
fiduciary duty to the seller, who remained a member of the LLC, when it operated the company in 
a way that prevented the seller from obtaining an additional earn-out payment.  No. 12220-VCL, 
2019 WL 855660 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2019).  In holding that the buyers did not violate any duty to 
the sellers, Vice Chancellor reiterated the principle that management does not owe any special duty 
to contractual rightsholders, and “a fiduciary violates the standard of conduct if the fiduciary seeks 
to maximize the value of a contractual claim at the expense of the fiduciary’s beneficiaries.”  Id. at 
*19.  The only duty owed by management is “to act in good faith to maximize the value of the 
Company over the long term” and, therefore, there is “no fiduciary obligation to protect the value 
of a contractual claim.”  Id. at *20–21. 
 65. See, e.g., Thompson Hine LLP, Let the Buyer (of Preferred Stock) Beware, LEXOLOGY 
(June 26, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=925ca358-fb5b-4087-b213-
322e767c637a. 
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“safeguard their preferred status,” such as ensuring the inclusion of 
“cumulative dividends, favorably priced conversion options of the preferred 
stock to common stock, automatic issuance of common stock or even a 
mandatory sale of the company.”66  Other options might include the creation 
of a liquidated damages clause for any breach,67 or, more appropriately for a 
joint venture agreement, adding other onerous consequences like a default 
provision with a forced buy-sell mechanism (whereby the breaching party 
risks losing its investment entirely if it does not cure the breach).  The purpose 
of such provisions would “be to put a thumb on the scale in favor of honoring 
the privileges associated with its preferred status.  Making it more painful for 
a board to breach contractual obligations increases the likelihood that the 
preferred stockholder’s preferences will be upheld, thereby providing greater 
protection from loss.”68  In addition to strengthening contractually negotiated 
rights, practitioners also recommended considering whether investment 
capital would be better placed in mezzanine debt or some other investment 
structure rather than preferred stock to avoid the uncertainty surrounding 
stockholder consent rights created in the wake of Trados and to ensure the 
parties’ contractual agreements would be enforced as written by removing 
them from the realm of shareholder rights.69 
Many scholars have been similarly critical of the treatment of preferred 
stockholders in both Trados and ODN.70  Notwithstanding this criticism, 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Liquidated damages provisions are enforceable under Delaware law where they are not 
intended to act as a “punishment for default” but instead represent “the parties’ best guess of the 
amount of injury that would be sustained in a contractual breach, a way of rendering certain and 
definite damages which would otherwise be uncertain or not easily susceptible of proof.”  S.H. 
Deliveries v. TriState Courier & Carriage Inc., No. 96C–02–086–WTQ, 1997 WL 817883, at *2 
(Del. Super. Ct. May 21, 1997).  They are permissible where (i) damages are uncertain or incapable 
of accurate calculation, and (ii) the specified amount is reasonable.  Del. Bay Surgical Servs., P.C. 
v. Swier, 900 A.2d 646, 651 (Del. 2006) (citing Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. 
1997)).  Given the inherent difficulty of valuing consent rights, as set forth in this article, it appears 
that the first part of this test would generally be satisfied in most cases involving the breach of a 
consent right. 
 68. Thompson Hine LLP, supra note 65. 
 69. Benet J. O’Reilly et al., Between Contractual and Fiduciary Duties: ODN Holding and the 
Rights of Preferred Stockholders, CLEARY M&A AND CORP. GOVERNANCE WATCH (June 8, 2017), 
https://www.clearymawatch.com/2017/06/contractual-fiduciary-duties-odn-holding-rights-
preferred-stockholders/. 
 70. See, e.g., Robert P. Bartlett, III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Means to an End, 
38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 255, 256 (2015) (critiquing Trados as advocating an approach that would 
“seem to require as a matter of complying with directors’ fiduciary duties the type of reckless, go-
for-broke gambles known to plague leveraged firms nearing financial distress”); Elizabeth Pollman, 
Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 155, 190–91 (2019) (“Corporate law scholars have pointed 
out that this interpretation [in Trados and ODN] can give rise to inefficient outcomes that fail to 
maximize aggregate welfare.  Consequently, they argue for an understanding of fiduciary duty that 
requires directors to maximize the aggregate value of all classes of equity—otherwise stated as firm 
value—without regard to its allocation.”); Sanga & Talley, supra note 9, at 4 (“[C]ourts can more 
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Delaware courts have continued to state the rule that a “board can readily 
comply with its fiduciary duties while making a decision that breaches a 
contract, just as a board could opt to comply with a contract under 
circumstances where its fiduciary duties would call for engaging in efficient 
breach.”71  Under the legal analysis that continues to prevail in Delaware, 
then, the fact that a company is bound by certain contractual obligations is 
completely divorced from the question of whether the company acted in 
accordance with its fiduciary obligations to all stockholders. 
III. SHOULD CONSENT RIGHTS BE “EFFICIENTLY” BREACHED? 
What are we to make of these two parallel strains on law?  On one hand, 
Delaware law promises investors that its courts will enforce a corporation’s 
contractual obligations as the parties negotiated them, but on the other, it tells 
preferred stockholders that the corporation is free to breach those same 
contractual obligations so long as doing so benefits other stockholders.  
Under Delaware’s prevailing standard, if a company refrains from taking 
action to benefit common stockholders in order to respect its preferred 
investors’ contractual rights, it appears that courts will not assume that its 
decision to abide by its contract was appropriate—even though investors 
undoubtedly expect that the corporation will honor their rights in the normal 
course of business.  Such an expectation is especially reasonable given that 
corporations are strictly prohibited from violating positive laws,72 and it is 
not immediately apparent why contractual obligations should be treated 
differently from other types of legal obligations.  Indeed, if investors believed 
the corporation was free to breach its contractual obligations at will, it is 
difficult to imagine that they would make an investment at all.73  This state 
of affairs is all the more unusual because it seems to undermine the 
longstanding rule that “Delaware respects ‘the primacy of contract law over 
 
effectively induce value-maximizing decisions through an ‘anti Trados’ rule that grants primacy to 
preferred shareholders (rather than common).  This result stands in stark contrast to the Trados 
doctrine, which mandates the opposite approach and ultimately achieves less”). 
 71. PWP Xerion Holdings III LLC v. Red Leaf Res., Inc., No. 2017-0235-JTL, 2019 WL 
5424778, at *15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 2019) (citing Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., 
No. 12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, at *24 (Del. Ch. 2017)). 
 72. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 73. The counterargument, of course, is that investors—who are often sophisticated parties aided 
by legal counsel—already understand that any contractual rights they negotiate can be breached by 
the company so long as the company later pays damages.  The relative scarcity of case law assessing 
damages for the breach of a consent right, however, suggests that this path is rarely followed so 
investors would have no reason to anticipate it (and no ability to accurately predict damages).  See 
infra text accompanying notes 79–84. 
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fiduciary law in matters involving . . . contractual rights and obligations.’”74  
For that reason, courts generally refuse to create a fiduciary obligation 
inconsistent with a party’s contractual rights.75  But if contract law is 
supreme, how can a corporation legitimately disregard its contractual 
obligations in favor of fulfilling its fiduciary duties? 
If these legal doctrines are to be meaningfully reconciled with respect 
to the enforcement of consent rights, it must be done through the remedies 
that flow from a breach of such rights.  I address the issues of damages and 
injunctive relief in turn, along with other consequences that must be 
considered in determining whether a breach is truly “efficient.”  In short, 
given that consent rights are difficult to value and the breach of a contract 
with key investors, lenders, or other counterparties is likely to have wide-
ranging repercussions, courts should strongly consider using injunctive relief 
to enforce consent rights.  Once a company is ordered to refrain from acting 
without the rightsholder’s consent, the power balance in negotiations for that 
party’s consent shifts from the company to the rightsholder—which is 
precisely what the parties would have expected when they negotiated their 
respective contractual rights. 
A. Calculating Damages for Breach of a Consent Right 
Like all contractual breaches, the usual method for calculating damages 
for the breach of a consent right is based on the non-breaching party’s 
expectation interest—that is, “an amount that will give the injured party ‘the 
benefit of its bargain by putting that party in the position it would have been 
but for the breach.’”76  “The primary element of expectation damages is the 
[sic] ‘the value that the performance would have had to the injured party,’ or 
the ‘loss in value’ caused by the deficient performance compared to what had 
been expected.”77  In the context of a consent right breach, expectation 
damages can be calculated based on (i) the actual harm caused by the breach, 
 
 74. Marubeni Spar One, LLC v. Williams Field Servs. – Gulf Coast Co., L.P., No. 2018-0908-
SG, 2020 WL 64761, at *10 n.95 (Del. Ch. Jan. 7, 2020) (quoting Renco Grp., Inc. v. MacAndrews 
AMG Holdings LLC, No. 7668-VCN, 2015 WL 394011, at *7 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 2015)). 
 75. See Norton v. K-Sea Transp. Partners L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 362 (Del. 2013) (holding that the 
general partner could have no fiduciary duties regarding its merger approval where the contract gave 
it “sole discretion” to “consent to a merger”); Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, No. 
5001-VCS, 2010 WL 2929708, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010) (“When a fiduciary duty claim is 
plainly inconsistent with the contractual bargain struck by parties to an . . . alternative entity 
agreement, the fiduciary duty claim must fall . . . .”). 
 76. Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy Renewables LLC, 210 A.3d 688, 695 (Del. 2019) (quoting 
Genencor Int’l, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 766 A.2d 8, 11 (Del. 2000)). 
 77. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 1981)). 
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or (ii) the amount that the rightsholder could have obtained for its consent in 
a hypothetical negotiation.78 
Unfortunately, consent rights have proven notoriously difficult to value.  
Litigants are rarely able to show the “actual harm” caused by the breach, 
given the intangible nature of the right and the fact that breaches frequently 
occur when a company is in some type of distress—thereby making it 
difficult to prove that the breach, rather than other circumstances, was the 
cause of the harm.79 
That leaves only a second form of expectation damages, which may be 
“calculated based on the expected outcome of a hypothetical negotiation 
between these parties before” the decision to breach.80  As then-Chancellor 
Strine acknowledged in Fletcher v. ION81 in 2013, this is “an exercise in 
counterfactual historical imagination that is, by its very nature, fraught with 
uncertainty.”82  To determine the likely path of a hypothetical negotiation, a 
court must begin by considering “which parties would have been involved in 
the hypothetical negotiation and what leverage those parties would have 
had.”83  Then, a court must determine, “using its best effort, how the 
hypothetical negotiation likely would have ended.”84 
This analysis did not go particularly well for the Fletcher plaintiff, who 
alone held the right to consent to a $40 million bridge financing that was a 
minor portion of a much larger transaction.85  Chancellor Strine held that the 
plaintiff lacked sufficient leverage to extract a large value for his consent due 
to several factors, including the need for other lenders to approve any consent 
payment to him and the fact that the defendant “could have structured the 
transaction to avoid implicating the Fletcher plaintiff’s consent right.”86  The 
court suggested that it would be skeptical of any consent rightsholder who 
“viewed its consent right as an opportunity to coerce value from” a 
 
 78. Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy Wind LLC, No. 11830-VCL, 2018 WL 1882746, at *26, 
31 (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2018), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Invenergy Renewables LLC, 210 
A.3d at 695; Fletcher Int’l, Ltd. v. Ion Geophysical Corp., No. 5109-CS, 2013 WL 6327997, at *11 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2013). 
 79. See, e.g., Fletcher, 2013 WL 6327997, at *11; Zimmerman v. Crothall, 62 A.3d 676, 716 
(Del. Ch. 2013) (holding plaintiff suffered no actual damages from defendants’ contractual breach 
of awarding only nominal damages of $1). 
 80. Fletcher, 2013 WL 6327997, at *18; see also Cedarview Opportunities Master Fund, L.P. 
v. Spanish Broad. Sys., Inc., No. 2017-0785-AGB, 2018 WL 4057012, at *12 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 
2018) (noting that “money damages in the form of a hypothetical consent fee could remedy a proven 
breach”) (quoting Def.’s Opening Br. at 43-44, Cedarview Opportunities Master Fund, L.P, 2018 
WL 4057012 at *1).  
 81. No. 5109-CS, 2013 WL 6327997 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2013). 
 82. Id. at *19. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at *1. 
 86. Id. at *2.   
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corporation, even for a transaction that “was highly beneficial to” the 
rightsholder.87  Chancellor Strine further noted that in a prior consent rights 
case, Zimmerman v. Crothall,88 the plaintiff had “learned a lesson about 
overplaying one’s hand” after the court awarded it only nominal damages for 
the breach of a consent right that benefited the plaintiff.89 
Thus, Fletcher provided the “reasonableness” check for damages 
stemming from the use of consent rights that courts refused to apply in cases 
like Superior Vision and Related Westpac when addressing the existence of 
a breach.90  While a party can be as unreasonable as it wishes in refusing to 
grant consent, the party assumes the risk that the corporation can simply 
breach the contract and—if the rightsholder cannot prove it was harmed—
pay nothing.  With those guidelines in place, the parties are presumably 
encouraged to work to find a negotiated solution without court intervention.  
However, a consent rightsholder’s leverage in such a negotiation is 
undermined by uncertainty surrounding a potential future damages award.  
As explained below, the availability of equitable relief (in the form of a 
temporary injunction or specific performance) would bring a rightsholder’s 
leverage in these negotiations more in line with the parties’ expectations at 
the time of contracting, particularly where that consent is required to move 
forward with a corporate action highly desired by the company. 
In the end, the Fletcher plaintiff was awarded a meager $300,000, far 
less than the multimillion dollar “king’s ransom” that he had sought.91  What 
is more remarkable is that this appears to be the highest amount of damages 
ever awarded under a “hypothetical negotiation” framework, which is 
admittedly seldom used.92  It is possible that when parties have sufficient 
leverage to extract large concessions or payments for their consent, they do 
not need a court’s help to do so; it is equally possible that corporations 
generally respect consent rights and do not often breach them (at least when 
the rightsholder would be likely to seek judicial intervention).  Regardless of 
the reason, the absence of any substantial damages awards as measured by a 
“hypothetical negotiation” suggests that this measure of damages may be 
more theoretical than practical. 
The difficulty in valuing consent rights is further shown by Vice 
Chancellor Laster’s initial decision in Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy Wind 
 
 87. Id. at *18. 
 88. 62 A.3d 676 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 89. Fletcher, 2013 WL 6327997, at *18. 
 90. See supra Section I.B. 
 91. Id. at *2, *26. 
 92. See supra notes 79–84 and accompanying text. 
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LLC,93 which awarded only nominal damages for the breach of a preferred 
investors’ right to approve a certain type of sale.94  Although the parties’ 
contract provided that the sale would trigger a premium payment to the 
investor calculated according to a contractual formula (which totaled $126 
million), Vice Chancellor Laster found that the company had engaged in an 
“efficient breach” and a hypothetical negotiation would have yielded no 
payment in light of the company’s other options and the “lack of any financial 
pressure.”95  Thus, instead of awarding the plaintiff the $126 million that it 
had expected, the court awarded the plaintiff a single dollar.96 
The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed, acknowledging the concept 
of “efficient breach” but clarifying that the doctrine “does not bar recovery 
or modify damages calculations in any way . . . . [E]fficient breach does not 
allow the breaching party to bypass the usual method of calculating 
damages.”97  It was similarly an error to attempt to reconstruct a hypothetical 
negotiation, the Court held, because the contract clearly specified the amount 
owed to the plaintiff.98  The Court awarded the plaintiff the full $126 
million.99  Thus, while the Supreme Court of Delaware ultimately awarded 
significant damages, it did so based on the functional equivalent of a 
liquidated damages provision—not a hypothetical negotiation.100  And if 
anything, this case further underscores how difficult it is to predict the 
amount of damages that a court will award for a defendant’s breach of the 
plaintiff’s consent right. 
In short, while it is intuitively appealing to value consent rights based 
on what a hypothetical counterparty would pay for them, the “hypothetical 
negotiation” test has proved to be a failed experiment. 
B. Availability of Equitable Relief  
There are two potential equitable remedies that can effectively force the 
parties to engage in a negotiation to obtain the rightsholder’s consent: (i) a 
preliminary injunction, which depending on the speed necessary for the 
desired corporate action may resolve the case entirely; and (ii) the remedy of 
specific performance, awarded after the court issues a final decision on the 
merits, which would bar further corporate action without consent.  Each form 
 
 93. No. 11830-VCL, 2018 WL 1882746 (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2018), rev’d, 210 A.3d 688 (Del. 
2019). 
 94. Id. at *33. 
 95. Id. at *31–32. 
 96. Id. at *38.  
 97. Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy Renewables LLC, 210 A.3d 688, 703 (Del. 2019). 
 98. Id. at 703–04. 
 99. Id. at 694, 704. 
 100. See supra text accompanying note 66. 
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of relief is considered to be an “extraordinary remedy” that is to be “granted 
sparingly.”101  Before granting both remedies, courts are required to engage 
in a balancing of the equities between the parties and to determine whether 
monetary damages are instead sufficient (and reasonably ascertainable) to 
remedy any harm.102  While courts have traditionally favored awarding 
monetary damages whenever possible, recent scholarship demonstrates that 
in one of the most common scenarios—where common stockholders breach 
preferred stockholders’ consent rights by wrongfully continuing a company 
that preferred stockholders wish to liquidate—no amount of money can 
efficiently compensate preferred stockholders for this breach.103 
Courts have cautioned that “[t]he preliminary injunction ‘burden is not 
a light one,’”104 and that the remedy of specific performance “is a matter of 
grace and not of right.”105  But what if both forms of equitable relief were 
more readily available to prevent the breach of one party’s consent right?  If 
courts were more willing to grant injunctions or order specific performance 
to enforce consent rights, it would force the parties to negotiate a resolution 
(by either obtaining consent or foregoing the desired corporate action).  This 
result would obviate the need for courts to engage in a post hoc recreation of 
a negotiation that did not occur.   
 
 101. Renco Grp., Inc. v. MacAndrews AMG Holdings LLC, No. 7668-VCN, 2013 WL 3369318, 
at *12 n.97 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2013) (“The granting of a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary 
remedy.”) (citing DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. & MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, CORPORATE AND 
COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY § 10.02(a), at 10–5 (2012)); W. 
Willow-Bay Court, LLC v. Robino-Bay Court Plaza, LLC, No. 2742-VCN, 2007 WL 3317551, at 
*12 (Del. Ch. Nov. 2, 2007), aff’d, 985 A.2d 391 (Del. 2009) (“Specific performance is an 
extraordinary remedy, appropriate where assessing money damages would be impracticable or 
would fail to do complete justice.”).   
 102. C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Empls.’ & Sanitation Empls.’ Ret. Tr., 107 
A.3d 1049, 1066 (Del. 2014) (“To obtain a preliminary injunction, the [petitioner] must 
demonstrate: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) that they will suffer 
irreparable injury without an injunction; and (3) that their harm without an injunction outweighs the 
harm to the defendants that will result from the injunction.”); Sarissa Cap. Domestic Fund LP v. 
Innoviva, Inc., No. 2017-0309-JRS, 2017 WL 6209597, at *26 (Del. Ch. Dec. 8, 2017) (“A party 
seeking specific performance must prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) the existence of a 
valid, enforceable contract; (2) the ‘essential elements’ of that contract; and (3) the absence of an 
adequate legal remedy.  The party seeking relief must also establish that it is ‘ready, willing and 
able to perform’ its contractual obligations, and that the ‘the balance of the equities’ . . . favor[s] 
granting specific performance.’”) (first quoting Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153, 
1158 (Del. 2010); then quoting Robino-Bay, 2007 WL 3317551, at *13). 
 103.  Sanga & Talley, supra note 9 , at 23–24.  Sanga and Talley’s model demonstrates that the 
ability to engage in an efficient breach varies depending on who controls the decisionmaking 
process for the company.  Where common control the ability to decide whether to liquidate a 
company, under the legal rule set forth in Trados, “efficient damages do not exist.”  Id. at 24. 
 104. Protech Sols., Inc. v. Delaware Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 2017-0642-TMR, 
2017 WL 5903357, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2017) (quoting Wayne Cty. Empls.’ Ret. Sys. v. Corti, 
954 A.2d 319, 329 (Del. Ch. 2008)). 
 105. Robino-Bay, 2007 WL 3317551, at *12. 
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Despite the difficulties inherent in calculating damages described above, 
courts have varied in their willingness to enjoin breaches of consent rights.  
For example, in Fletcher, the consent rightsholder sought a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the ION from issuing the $40 million loan in violation 
of its right to consent to the issuance.106  Vice Chancellor Parsons denied the 
application, holding that the threat of injury was not irreparable but was 
instead compensable with damages.107  Later, following the trial, then-
Chancellor Strine applied the hypothetical negotiation test to award damages, 
but suggested that injunctive relief should have been granted in the first 
instance because “consent rights cases are better dealt with by injunctive 
relief if the court can act with alacrity and give the parties a reasonable period 
to have the negotiation or work around the consent rights.”108  In other words, 
why try to reconstruct a “hypothetical negotiation” if you could enter an 
injunction and force an actual negotiation? 
Nonetheless, courts have not fully adopted this view and continue to 
maintain a reluctance to issue injunctions in support of consent rights.  More 
recently, in Tinicum Capital Partners II, L.P. v. Liberman Broadcasting, 
Inc.,109 Vice Chancellor Laster considered the plaintiff’s motion to 
preliminarily enjoin the defendant company from violating a contractual 
provision that prevented it from entering into binding transactions related to 
a spectrum auction by the FCC scheduled to start on March 29, 2016.110  
Under the parties’ agreement, the plaintiff was permitted the “absolute 
discretion” to “withhold or deny” its consent.111  On March 17, 2016—twelve 
days before the auction was to start—the court denied the motion, holding 
that the need for consent could be delayed until June and the parties could 
complete arbitration by that time.112  The court noted, however, that if there 
had been “a more imminent risk of decisions that could implicate the Consent 
Rights,” then an injunction may have been appropriate.113 
This scattered state of the law has left litigants confused about whether 
or not it is possible to obtain an injunction to secure consent rights.  The 
Invenergy plaintiff, for example, stated that he “believed that Leaf could not 
obtain an injunction because a court would hold that Leaf could receive 
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money damages as a remedy.”114  While there are undoubtedly circumstances 
where such relief is not warranted based on a consent rightsholder’s 
inequitable conduct, courts’ overriding reluctance to award equitable 
remedies is misguided in light of the difficulties inherent in calculating 
damages for a breach after the fact.115 
C. A Company’s Inability to “Efficiently” Breach a Contract Is Less 
Important Given the Ancillary Consequences of a Breach 
One consequence of a court’s increased willingness to grant injunctive 
relief or specific performance to enforce a consent provision is that a 
company’s ability to engage in an “efficient breach” of that provision would 
be severely curtailed.  That is, if the consent rightsholder can obtain a court 
order enjoining the breach before it occurs, then a breach carries more 
onerous consequences than simply paying damages after the fact.  Willfully 
disobeying a court order would almost inevitably result in the imposition of 
sanctions, which under Delaware law can range from penalty payments, to 
the admission of certain facts, to a default judgment.116  At the most extreme, 
it could potentially lead to the cancellation of the entities’ incorporation or 
formation documents.117  Under these circumstances, it is difficult to imagine 
how one could efficiently breach a party’s consent rights if that party is able 
to obtain an injunction to prevent it. 
But how significant is the loss of a company’s ability to breach a consent 
right?  A discussion of the inherent difficulty of determining what constitutes 
an “efficient breach” would be incomplete if it did not consider the many 
indirect consequences of a breach.  Even where a breach of consent rights 
would seem to make sense from an economic perspective, hard-to-predict 
costs and the intangible consequences of a breach mean that it is rarely, if 
ever, truly the most efficient path forward, at least when those consent rights 
are held by key investors or joint venture partners.   
 
 114. Leaf Invenergy Co. v. Invenergy Wind LLC, No. 11830-VCL, 2018 WL 1882746, at *22 
(Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2018), rev’d, 210 A.3d 688 (Del. 2019).  
 115. See supra Sections III.A–B. 
 116. See, e.g., Terramar Retail Ctrs., LLC v. Marion #2-Seaport Tr. U/A/D June 21, 2002, No. 
12875-VCL, 2018 WL 6331622, at *11 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2018). 
 117. In 2018 and 2019, Delaware enacted statutory law giving the state Attorney General the 
power to file proceedings to cancel or revoke an entities’ formative documents where the entity has 
engaged in the “abuse” or “misuse” of its powers.  See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 284(a) (1953) 
(corporations); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-112(a) (2018) (LLCs); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-
112 (2019) (partnerships).  In the first year since these rules’ enactment, the Attorney General has 
been sparing in their use, filing just six forfeiture actions against fifteen entities in 2019.  See Denis 
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As others have mentioned, “expectation damages as awarded in law 
often fall short of a truly compensatory measure due to the exclusion of such 
items as attorneys’ fees, unmeasurable subjective losses, and ‘unforeseeable’ 
damages.”118  This problem is worse in high-stakes commercial litigation, 
where legal fees can soar into the millions.  Moreover, because the ultimate 
remedy that a court will award is uncertain,119 a breaching party can easily 
end up worse off by paying substantial money for lawyers while also paying 
out damages that equal or exceed the amount that it would have cost simply 
to obtain the necessary consent.120  Some scholars have also pointed out that 
although “the received wisdom is that contract remedies do not exist to 
punish a breaching party,” in reality, often the remedies awarded by courts 
are harsher where the breaching party acted willfully.121  A finding of 
willfulness also opens up the possibility that a breaching party will be ordered 
to pay the nonbreaching party’s legal fees, which “may be awarded if it is 
shown that the defendant’s conduct forced the plaintiff to file suit to secure a 
clearly defined and established right.”122  
Moreover, particularly salient in the context of investment capital, 
breaching a party’s contractual consent rights can have substantial 
reputational consequences that may impact the corporation’s ability to 
conduct future business.123  As studies have shown, once a market participant 
is known to “cheat,” “it becomes common knowledge that the person lacks 
integrity” and their reputation is damaged.124  In other words, “the notion of 
a reputation is intimately tied to the concept of breach.  A party loses its 
reputation for performance or for trustworthiness whenever they breach an 
agreement.“125  Because contract disputes frequently become public through 
a corporation’s litigation disclosures, court filings, media attention, industry 
gossip, or other means, it is unreasonable to think that the market of investors 
or potential joint venturers would not learn about the breach of another 
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party’s consent rights.  For an early-stage company seeking investment 
capital, this loss of reputation might well be fatal.  Few investors would be 
comfortable relying on the contractual rights they negotiate with a 
corporation if they knew that the corporation was willing to breach its 
contractual obligations to previous investors. 
IV. A PATH FORWARD 
Thus, while courts have consistently floated the possibility of an 
“efficient breach” of a party’s consent rights, the reality of breaching such 
rights is far more onerous than is contemplated in those decisions.  Moreover, 
the full consequences of a breach are difficult to predict, making it impossible 
to determine at the time of breach whether that breach is in fact “efficient.”  
In light of all these considerations, the idea that a board could breach its 
fiduciary duty by honoring a party’s consent rights seems merely theoretical 
(at best).  Corporations should generally respect consent rights not for some 
moralistic purpose, but because it is generally in the best interests of all 
stockholders to preserve the company’s reputation and ability to seek out 
future capital. 
More broadly, the tension between the strict enforcement of contractual 
rights and courts’ willingness to accept that breach of those rights may be 
advisable (and free to the breaching party) can be resolved through the 
creation of a default rule that, in the usual course of business, consent rights 
are appropriately enforced with equitable relief.  The use of injunctions to 
protect a party’s right to consent would be consistent with courts’ treatment 
of other forms of restrictive covenants, including those commonly found in 
employment agreements.  For example, in enforcing classic restrictive 
covenants like noncompete and non-solicitation agreements, Delaware courts 
“use injunctive relief as the principal tool of enforcing covenants not to 
compete.”126  Similarly, much of the investor uncertainty and difficulty 
surrounding the enforcement of consent rights could be resolved simply by 
the adoption of this rule.  While the ability to efficiently breach a contract 
would be effectively lost, Delaware courts’ protection of bargained-for 
contractual rights through injunctive relief would send the same signal to 
potential investors as does their adherence to enforcing the plain terms of 
contractual language—that is, a signal that investor rights will be respected 
and enforced in Delaware. 
Moreover, the issuance of a temporary injunction or the award of 
specific performance forces the parties back to the bargaining table to have a 
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real negotiation.  A court is then relieved of having to reimagine a 
“hypothetical negotiation” that, by definition, failed in reality (since the 
parties ended up coming to court to resolve their dispute) and that requires a 
court to engage in precisely the type of “speculation” and “conjecture” that 
Delaware courts typically reject as a basis on which to award monetary 
damages.127  Instead, courts need only enjoin the breach of contract, and the 
parties can work out an optimal solution based on their own interests.  
Moreover, because the issuance of an injunction or specific performance 
requires a balancing of the equities,128 the involvement of courts at this stage 
can also help mitigate the “hostage” problem, as the court has discretion to 
decline to act where necessary to prevent particularly grievous harm to the 
corporation.  This procedure would have the additional benefit of insulating 
the corporation against a breach of fiduciary duty claim stemming from its 
recognition of contractual rights, as a corporation cannot possibly breach its 
fiduciary obligations by complying with a court order forcing it to abide by 
those same contractual obligations. 
Absent a greater judicial willingness to grant equitable relief, the current 
uncertainty will persist and consent rightsholders may not be as protected as 
they would have expected at the time of contracting.  Given the current state 
of the law, where possible, parties negotiating consent rights should create 
enforceable consequences for a breach.  On the flip side, a company can 
protect itself from improper hostage-taking by rightsholders by specifying 
that consent may not be unreasonably withheld.  Until the parties can be 
confident that Delaware courts will adequately protect both a party’s consent 
rights alongside the rights of the corporation, these protective measures are 
necessary to ensure that the parties’ reasonable expectations about their 
contractual rights are fulfilled. 
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